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The Increasingly Covert and Invasive Surveillance of Students and Its Visible
Role in the School-to-Prison Pipeline
Andy Froelich'
Schools are places where we inculcate the values essential to the meaningful exercise of rights
and responsibilitiesby a self-governing citizenry. If the Nation's students can be convicted
through the use of arbitrarymethods destructive of personalliberty, they cannot help but feel
that they have been dealt with unfairly.2
I.

INTRODUCTION

American schools are much different places today than they were a few decades ago. Since
the rise in school shootings, school districts around the country have turned to police officers and
school-based surveillance technologies to keep their students safe. 3 In the past twenty years,
technological advances have dominated the evolution of school safety. 4 At many schools, metal
detectors at school entrances and video surveillance systems have become commonplace. 5 More
recently, schools have advanced their surveillance methods to include biometric technology, such
as fingerprint identification and facial recognition, to monitor the influx of people entering
schools.6
Schools throughout the country have utilized some sort of surveillance in order to lessen
the impact of school violence, bullying, self-harm, and other safety concerns. 7 Recently, the tragic

school shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida pushed school
districts across the nation to invest in advanced technology that can more closely and covertly
surveil their student bodies, on and off school property.8 This surveillance has significantly
evolved from passive methods of metal detectors and security cameras 9 to more active, intrusive
methods.1 0 These expanded methods include filtering the use of school-owned technology,

1J.D. Candidate, May 2021, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 373-74 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
3 Anya Kamenetz & Jessica Bakeman, To Prevent School Shootings, DistrictsAre Surveilling Students' Online
Lives, NPR (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/12/752341188/when-school-safety-becomes-schoolsurveillance.
4 See Mark Keierleber, Inside the $3 Billion School Security Industry: Companies Marketed Sophisticated
Technology To 'Harden'Campuses, but Will It Make Us Safe?, THE 74 (Aug. 9, 2018),
https://www. the74million. org/article/inside-the-3-billion-school-security-industry-companies-market-sophisticatedtechnology-to-harden-campuses-but-will-it-make-us-safe/; see also Deborah Ahrens, Schools, Cyberbullies, and the
Surveillance State, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1669, 1678 (2013).
5 Keierleber, supra note 4; Ahrens, supra note 4.
6 Ahrens, supra note 4, at 1678; Kamenetz & Bakeman, supra note 3.
? Student Privacy Resource Center, School Safety and Student Privacy:An Introduction, YOUTUBE (Jun. 3, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2CiDnileE5A&feature=emb_title.
8 See Lori Bezahler, We Should Be Alarmed by Schools' Creepy Plan to Monitor Students, GUARDIAN (Oct. 18,
2019), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/oct/18/school-shootings-surveillance-police-databaseprivacy.
9 Ahrens, supra note 4.
10 Lois Beckett, Under Digital Surveillance: How American Schools Spy on Millions of Kids, GUARDIAN (Oct. 22,
2019), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/22/school-student-surveillance-bark-gaggle.
2 New
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monitoring students' social media activity, predictive analytics, and a visible law enforcement
presence in many schools.1 1
The role and presence of police officers in schools has become an increasingly
controversial and problematic issue in communities throughout the United States. In particular,
Chicago Public Schools (CPS) provide a compelling example of this public discourse. Schoolbased law enforcement programs, commonly known as School Resource Officer (SRO) programs
were originally developed as a way for police departments to build better relations between
communities' youth and the police department. 12 However, this effort has transformed into 52,000
police officers patrolling the hallways of schools each year.1 3 And in the 2013-2014 school year,
these SROs made an estimated 70,000 arrests nationwide. 14 Until recently, the 248 officers
working in CPS schools were not required to have any formalized or specialized training, nor did
the Chicago Police Department (CPD) and CPS have any formalized agreement that defined the
roles and responsibilities of police officers working in schools.1 5 In 2020, after much scrutiny and
pressure from the community and the Office of the Inspector General, 16 CPS and CPD finalized a
Memorandum of Understanding that dictates the responsibilities of each agency pertaining to the
SRO program, and the roles and limitations of the assigned SROs. 17
These programs remain controversial not only in Chicago but around the country, as many
organizations are calling for the termination of SRO programs. 18 However, given the amount of
resources and money that school systems have already invested in school policing and
surveillance, the extensive number of officers currently stationed in schools, and the nationwide
epidemic of school shootings, it is clear that many police officers will not be exiting the hallways
of schools any time soon. However, in the aftermath of the murder of George Floyd by
Minneapolis police officers, school districts across the country have begun to revisit this issue with
many choosing to remove SROs entirely from their schools. 19
This article will first explore how school districts use covert and invasive surveillance
methods like social media monitoring, school-issued device monitoring, and predictive analytics

" Student Privacy Resource Center, supra note 7; see Stephen Sawchuk, What School DistrictsShould Know About
Policing School Police, EDUC. WEEK (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2019/10/02/what-districtsshould-know-about-policing-school.html.
12 MICHELLE MBEKEANI-WILEY, SARGEANT SHRIVER NAT'L CTR. ON POVERTY LAW, HANDCUFFS IN HALLWAYS:
THE STATE OF POLICING IN CHICAGO PUBLIC SCHOOLS 7 (2017), https://www.povertylaw.org/wp-

content/uploads/2019/08/handcuffs-in-hallways-final.pdf.
13 Sawchuk, supra note 11.
14 Evie Blad & Alex Harwin, Analysis Reveals Racial Disparitiesin School Arrests,
PBS (Feb. 27, 2017),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/education/analysis -reveals-racial-disparities-school-arrests.
15 MICHELLE MBEKEANI-WILEY, supra note, 12, at 4, 16; CITY OF CHI. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE
CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT'S MANAGEMENT OF SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS 1 (2018),

https://igchicago.org/2018/09/13/review-of-the-chicago-police-departments-management-of-school-resourceofficers/.
16 See CITY OF CHI. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 15.
17 Yana Kunichoff, Here's a FirstLook at the $33 Million Deal Between Chicago Schools and the City's Police

Department, CHALKBEAT CHI. (Jan. 15, 2020), https://chalkbeat.org/posts/chicago/2020/01/15/heres-a-first-look-atthe-33-million-deal-between-chicago-schools-and-the-citys-police-department/.
18 Sophie Sherry, Pull Chicago Policefrom CPS Schools and use that $33 Million on Mental Health Services
Instead, Activists and Elected Leaders Say, CHI. TRIBUNE (June 9, 2020),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-george-floyd-chicago-police-schools-mental-health-cps20200609-2reexackwzegjmtr3jyemokt34-story.html.
19 Moriah Balingit et al., Fueled by Protests, School DistrictsAcross the Country Cut Ties with Police, WASH. POST
(June 12, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2020/06/12/schools-police-george-floyd-protests/.
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as well as the eyes and ears of police officers inside school buildings. In section III, the article will
provide an overview of the school-to-prison pipeline and discuss how enhanced student monitoring
will increase the prevalence of this pipeline. An important implication is that this reality
disproportionally affects students of color and students with disabilities. The article will also focus
on Chicago as a model of how these invasive surveillance practices will only serve to fuel the
school-to-prison pipeline, rather than reduce crime and gun violence. This article specifically
focuses on Chicago due to CPD's expanding breadth of resources and emerging technology that
shapes its harmful surveillance presence in Chicago schools. In section IV, this article will also
analyze how the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence applies to these forms of
surveillance and argue that invasive surveillance technology in schools should be held to the higher
standard of privacy under Riley. To conclude, the article suggests one overarching alternative
method to better serving the goals of school safety: improving mental health resources in schools.
II.

SCHOOL SURVEILLANCE METHODS

This section introduces some of the most prominent school surveillance methods that
districts across the country, including CPS, are developing and implementing.
A. Social Media Monitoring
In reaction to the rise of school shootings, particularly the Parkland shooting, school
districts across the country have collaborated with local law enforcement agencies and security
technology companies to develop new school-based surveillance systems. 20 A major result is the
implementation of technology that tracks students' social media accounts and school-issued
electronic devices. 2 1 Given the prevalence of social media in the average student's life, schools
have found that many acts of violence and self-harm are foreshadowed by "a social media
footprint." 22 Security technology companies first developed social media monitoring systems for
law enforcement agencies to track and collect information, but in the past five years, these
companies have started to market this technology to American school districts. 23 Research shows
that purchases of such social media monitoring technology by schools has increased significantly
since 2014.24 This technology, often with the aid of an analyst, collects data from students' social
media posts by scanning for keywords or phrases that could indicate an occurrence of school
violence, cyberbullying, self-harm, or criminal activity. 25 Thus, by using these technologies,
schools hope not only to thwart school shootings, but also cyberbullying, self-harm, and gang or
criminal activity. 26

Kamenetz & Bakeman, supra note 3.
21 Beckett, supra note 10.
22 Kamenetz & Bakeman, supra
note 3.
23 Dell Cameron, CIA-backed Surveillance Software Was Marketed to Schools, DAILY
DOT (Oct. 18, 2016),
https://www.dailydot.com/layer8/geofeedia-surveillance-software-high-school-chicago-social-media-monitoring/.
20

24

Faiza Patel et al., School Surveillance Zone, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Apr. 30, 2019),

https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/school-surveillance-zone.
25 Karen Turner, Schools Are Helping Police Spy on Kids' Social Media Activity, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/04/22/schools-are-helping-police-spy-on-kids-socialmedia-activity/.
26 Student Privacy Resource Center, supra note 7.
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In an effort to curb the rising level of gun violence among youth in the city, CPD, CPS,
and the University of Chicago Crime Lab initiated the Connect and Redirect to Respect program
("Connect and Redirect") to surveil CPS students' social media accounts without their
knowledge. 2 7 Through Connect and Redirect, CPS has surveilled over 25,000 students' social
media accounts since 2015.28 A review of 400 reports from the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 school
years found more than 20 percent of the interventions involved police officers. 29 In most of the
detected gang or gun-related social media posts, the schools brought in CPD's Gang School Safety
Team, a police team that CPD established in 2008 to intervene when a school-age person is a
victim of gun violence. 30 When the Connect and Redirect began, the Gang School Safety Team's
mission expanded to include interventions from the program's social media detections.3 1 Since the
initiation of this program, only a limited number of interventions have led to arrests as CPS has
sought to keep this program from becoming punitive; however, the increased police presence at
schools and the secretive nature of the program is troubling. 32
The tactics of Connect and Redirect were covert from its onset. Throughout its pilot stage,
CPS did not inform students or parents that they were monitoring students in this way nor were
parents called to the school when students were subjected to an intervention. 33 Additionally, in
2016, only a few of the administrators at the pilot schools even knew that the social media
surveillance was occurring-highlighting the lack of transparency in this pilot and method of
surveillance. 34
In Chicago, there is no agreement between CPS and the Gang School Safety Team that
dictates what CPD can do with students' social media data after intervening at a school.3 5
Furthermore, there is no agreement or policy restricting CPD from documenting this data or adding
certain students to the city's gang database. 36 Despite these concerns, the University of Chicago
Crime Lab claimed in their final report on the Connect and Redirect pilot that the evidence
suggested that "students attending participating high schools were at lower risk of being shooting
victims; experienced fewer misconduct incidents and out-of-school suspensions; and attended
school for several additional days," compared to students at non-participating high schools.3 7
However, there is a lack of evidence that in schools across the country, invasive efforts like social
media surveillance has any real impact on school safety. 3 8
The questionable and opaque utilization of social media filtering by CPD is an emerging
trend nationwide. 39 After the Parkland shooting, the Florida legislature passed a law that mandated
27

UNIV. OF CHI. CRIME LAB, CONNECT AND REDIRECT TO RESPECT: FINAL REPORT 3 (2019) [hereinafter CRIME

LAB]; Aaron Leibowitz & Sarah Karp, Chicago Public Schools Quietly Monitors Social Media for Student Gang
Activity, WBEZ (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.wbez.org/shows/wbez-news/chicago-public-schools-quietly-monitorssocial-media-for-student-gang-activity/fib 1584e-5860-47d8-8658-50al df9045d0.
28 Leibowitz & Karp, supra note
27.
29 Id.
30

Id.

31 Id.

Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
32

37 CRIME LAB, supra note 27.
38 See generally James H. Price & Jagdish Khubchandani, School FirearmViolence Prevention Practicesand
Policies: Functionalor Folly?, 6 VIOLENCE & GENDER 154 (2019); see also Patel et al., supra note 24.
39 Patel et al., supra note 24.

https://lawecommons.luc.edu/clrj/vol40/iss2/4

4

Froelich: The Increasingly Covert and Invasive Surveillance of Students and

The Increasingly Covert and Invasive Surveillance of Students

122

the development of a centralized database for people that would combine their criminal record,
social-service record, and social media history. 4 0 This database provides school officials, law
enforcement, and other state actors with a network of surveillance capabilities for potentially
unknown purposes. 4 1 As discussed below, there are several issues that privacy advocates believe
could have significant consequences, especially for students of color and students with
disabilities. 42 This technology is also likely to produce false positives based on mistake,
misinterpretation, and misuse. 4 3 Many of the same concerns that exist for conducting social media
surveillance also hold true for monitoring school-issued electronic devices.
B. School Technology Monitoring
As of 2018, 33 percent of schools in the United States had the capabilities to offer one
device for every two students, and an additional 40 percent of K-12 schools had technology
systems that offered one device (tablet or laptop) per student ("1:1 technology"). 44 Students often
bring these devices home to complete homework, especially with schools that offer 1:1 technology.
Overall, the use of school-issued and personal devices in schools and homes has dramatically
increased, making personal devices a key educational tool in most districts.
After the Parkland shooting, technology company Bark offered schools free surveillance
systems that would automatically monitor students' emails, documents, and chat messages twentyfour hours a day. 45 The system would then send an alert to school administration if it flagged
certain words or phrases. 4 6 Similar to social media monitoring, law enforcement can receive
flagged messages, emails, or searches on school-issued technology and take action. 47 Another
surveillance company, Gaggle, has been contracted by more than 1,400 schools to "stop tragedies
with real-time content analysis." 48 Gaggle currently surveils over 4.8 million U.S. students by
tracking anything and everything that may come across school-issued technology or any content
linked to a school email address. 49
Some districts also use technology that monitors what students search for on their schoolissued iPads or computers. Significantly, in some school technology monitoring systems, the
monitoring does not end when a student leaves the school. 50 In these districts, school officials

40 Benjamin Herold, To Stop School Shootings, Fla. Will Merge Government Data, Social Media Posts, EDUC.
WEEK (July 26, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2018/07/26/to-stop-school-shootings-fla-willmerge.html.
41 Id.
42 See Kamenetz & Bakeman, supra note 3.
43 Patel et al., supra note 24.
44 Sean Cavanagh, Snapshot of K-12 Tech Landscape: More DistrictsReach 1:1, but Equity Gaps Persist,EDWEEK
MARKET BRIEF (Jan. 5, 2018), https://marketbrief.edweek.org/marketplace-k-12/snapshot-k-12-tech-landscapedistricts-reach-i-i-equity-gaps-persist/. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the switch to virtual learning, many
more school districts have implemented 1:1 technology programs. See David Saleh Rauf, Covid-19 Forces the
Question: Should the Youngest LearnersHave Devices?, EDUC. WEEK (June 8, 2020),
https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2020/06/08/covid-19-forces-the-question-chromebooks-ipads-for.html.
45 Beckett, supra note 10.
46 Id.
4? Id.
48 Caroline Haskins, Gaggle Knows Everything About Teens and Kids in School, BUzzFEED NEWS (Nov. 1, 2019),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/carolinehaskins 1/gaggle-school-surveillance-technology-education.
49 Id.

so Turner, supra note 25.
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could be alerted in the middle of the night based on what a student types into their Google search
on a school-issued device.5 1
Unlike social media monitoring where the surveillance is conducted on public platforms,
the school technology surveillance is monitoring messages, emails, and searches that students
likely believe to be private.5 2 In 2010, a family filed a lawsuit against the Lower Merion School
District in Pennsylvania for using webcams on school-issued laptops to monitor students at
home.5 3 The family discovered this practice after a teacher accused the student, Blake Robbins, of
dealing drugs based on a photo taken autonomously by the computer while Blake was in his
bedroom. 54 The school district never disclosed to parents that they could remotely activate the
laptop cameras to take photos. 55 At the time of the lawsuit, the school district had in their
possession over 56,000 photos from their loaned out laptop cameras. 56 Although this is an extreme
case, it is a stark example of the scope of intrusiveness that can result from school technology
monitoring.
Since the school shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in 2012, school districts
across the country have spent millions of dollars to monitor what their students write and search
for on school-issued technology.5 7 This technology has given schools and their analysts the ability
to search through a student's message, search, and email history on their school devices to see if
there is any pattern between what they are searching, writing, and reading. 5 8 This begs the question:
if and when data is collected, how long are schools keeping this data, and who are they sending it
to?

According to the Children's Internet Protection Act of 2001, federal law requires that
public schools block access to harmful websites and "[monitor] the online activities of minors and
the operation of a technology protection measure with respect to any of its computers with Internet
access that protects against access through such computers to visual depictions that are obscene,
child pornography, or harmful to minors." 59 However, this law has not provided school districts
with proper guidelines. 60 Therefore, many schools have been compelled to define for themselves
what the law allows them to do. 6 1 There are very few guidelines that would prevent a school from
collecting and maintaining online data from their students for the entire time they are enrolled at
the school. 62 Furthermore, the student data that schools and surveillance companies are collecting
may also be sent to law enforcement agencies. 63
With this sort of tracking, one bad decision or misunderstanding could impact a student for
the rest of their life. 64 Further, as with the social media monitoring, the potential for false positives,
51 Beckett, supra note 10.
52 Id.

5 Kashmir Hill, Lower Merion School Districtand Blake Robbins Reach Settlement in Spycamgate, FORBES (Oct.
11, 2010), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2010/10/11/lower-merion-school-district-and-blake-robbinsreach-a-settlement-in-spycamgate/#6be359ae2c60.

54 Id.
5 Id.
56
Id.
5 Beckett, supra note 10.
58 Id.
59 Children's Internet Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(5)(B)(i) (2018).
60 Beckett, supra note
10.
61 Id.
62 Student Privacy Resource Center, supra note 7.
63 Beckett, supra note
10.
64 Student Privacy Resource Center, supra note
7.
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misunderstandings, and misuse is great. School technology monitoring analysts are likely to be
older and "from different cultural backgrounds than the students they are monitoring." 65 Thus, an
analyst's misunderstanding of a joke or slang in a message as a real threat "could expose students
to law enforcement in a way they have not been in the past." 66
C. Eyes and Ears: SRO Surveillance
Approximately 52,000 police officers patrol school hallways across the country as SROs
about 45 percent of U.S. schools have an SRO. 67 Triggered by pressure to make schools safer after
the Columbine shooting in 1999, the number of police officers in schools rose 38 percent from
1997 to 2007.68 A federally funded 2005 study by the National Institute of Justice showed that the
average SRO spends roughly half of their time each work week on law enforcement activities. 69
This raises the question: what are police officers' primary goals and objectives when they walk
the halls of public schools across the country? In Chicago, the expansive police presence in schools
and the lack of transparent agreements between CPS and CPD gives police officers in schools the
resources and infrastructure to covertly gather information and conduct surveillance on students. 70
Even after the new Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between CPS and CPD, many
questions and concerns still remain about the presence of police officers in schools.
CPD has a system in place known as the "gang database" that allows police officers to
track and find out if a person has ever been identified as being part of a particular gang. 7 1 CPSbased SROs possibly utilize what they see and hear in the hallways to log students' gang
affiliations into the gang database. 72 There are no policies in place that prevent an SRO from
wrongfully placing a student in the gang database. 73 Additionally, with the implementation of the
Connect and Redirect pilot and school technology monitoring, data collected from this surveillance
can be sent to the police, and depending on the nature of the information, could lead to a student
being added to the gang database. 74
Chicago's gang database has received considerable scrutiny for its lack of oversight and
widespread inaccuracies. 75 And sadly, false designations can have serious implications that can
prevent people from "finding work and getting licenses, immigration relief and housing, as well
as lead to higher bonds and longer paroles if they are convicted of a crime." 76 Suspiciously, CPS
ran over 87,000 gang database inquiries from 2009 to 2018, accounting for roughly 2 percent of
65
66
67

Beckett, supra note 10.
Id. (quoting Elizabeth Laird, a senior fellow for student privacy at the Center for Democracy and Technology).
Sawchuk, supra note 11.

68 AMANDA PETTERUTI, JUST. POL'Y INST., EDUCATION UNDER ARREST: THE CASE
AGAINST POLICE IN SCHOOLS 1,

5 (2011), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/educationunderarrest_fullreport.pdf.
69 Id.

70 See

MBEKEANI-WILEY, supra note 12, at 15-16.

Sarah Karp, Chicago Mom Accuses School Police of Labeling Her Son a Gang Member, WBEZ (Apr. 10, 2019),
https://www.wbez.org/stories/chicago-mom-accuses-school-police-of-labeling-her-son-a-gang-member/e1 8087b264a7-4783-b8a0-d28127de5e09.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Leibowitz & Karp, supra note 27.
?5 Heather Cherone, 95 Percentof Chicagoans Listed as Gang Members by Chicago Police are Black, Latino,
Watchdog Audit Finds, BLOCK CLUB CHI. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://blockclubchicago.org/2019/04/11/95-percent-ofchicagoans-listed-as-gang-members-by-chicago-police-are-black-latino-watchdog-audit-finds/.
76 Leibowitz & Karp, supra note
27.
71

Published by LAW eCommons, 2021

7

Children's Legal Rights Journal, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 4

125

Children'sLegal Rights Journal

[Vol 40:2 2020]

the total database inquiries in that time period. 77 Of all the external agencies with access to the
gang database, CPS ranked third in the number of database inquires conducted, behind the Cook
County Sheriff and the Illinois Department of Corrections. 78
CPS and CPD have also come under fire recently in a report by the City of Chicago Office
of Inspector General for not having any written agreement that lays out guidelines for police in
Chicago schools. 79 The report noted that CPS and CPD could not even produce an accurate list of
the police officers currently stationed in Chicago schools, "making it impossible to track what
reports they were generating or whether they were accused of misconduct." 80 However, even under
the new MOU, many SROs can access certain databases through CPD computer terminals, a
practice that likely predates the MOU.8 1 In particular, SROs likely have access to the Citizen Law
Enforcement Analysis and Reporting (CLEAR) database, video surveillance located in CPS
schools, and the Strategic Subject List (SSL).
The CLEAR database is an investigative tool used by CPD that allows SROs to file reports
on students for simply violating a school policy. 82 This information can be accessed by CPD and
kept confidential from the public due to its categorization as "ongoing investigations." 83
SRO and police access to extensive video surveillance of schools is also concerning. After
the Parkland shooting, the Miami-Dade School District established a police command center that
gives police officers the ability to monitor 18,000 live camera feeds throughout the schools in the
district. 84 Similarly, in Chicago, CPD's Crime Prevention and Information Center can view the
4,500 security cameras located in CPS schools, expanding CPD's breadth of resources to surveil
Chicago students and collect information. 85
CPD also engages in predictive analytics with the SSL.86 The SSL uses a complex
algorithm to "rank individuals with a criminal record according to their probability of being
involved in a shooting or murder." 87 This program could allow SROs to utilize what they see and
hear in schools, their involvement in school discipline, and their interactions with students on a
daily basis to create data for the SSL.8 8
Similarly, in response to the Parkland shooting, schools in Florida are using a statewide
predictive analytics database to "collect, sort, and analyze sensitive information about students to
share with law enforcement." 89 Alarmingly, yet not surprisingly, this technology
disproportionately targets students of color. 90 The MIT Media Lab discovered "racial and gender
bias embedded in the very code that runs predictive data systems." 9 1 As will be discussed below,
students of color are more likely to be suspended or arrested at school than their white peers,
77 CITY OF CHI. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "GANG DATABASE"
26-

27 (2019), https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/OIG-CPD-Gang-Database-Review.pdf.
78 Id.

79 See CITY OF CHI. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 11.
80

Id.; Karp, supra note 71.
MBEKEANI-WILEY, supra note 12, at 15; Kunichoff, supra note 17.
82 MBEKEANI-WILEY, supra note 12, at 15.
81

83 Id.

Kamenetz & Bakeman, supra note 3.
85 MBEKEANI-WILEY, supra note 12, at 16.
84

86

Id. at 15.

87 Id.
" Id. at 15-16.
89 Bezahler, supra note 8.
90 Id.
91 Id.
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despite similar rates of misbehavior. 92 This article and other scholars are concerned that predictive
analytics systems will only make students of color more vulnerable to the school-to-prison
pipeline. 93
III.

THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE

On January 29, 2019, at Marshall Metropolitan High School, a CPS school, a teacher
notified two SROs to come and remove sixteen-year-old Dnigma Howard from the school for
having a cell phone in class. 94 As part of Dnigma's individualized education program, she was
allowed to ask for the school social worker whenever she had behavioral or emotional issues at
school. 95 However, on this day, since Marshall's only school social worker was unavailable,
Dnigma was instead escorted out of the school by two SROs. 96 In the process, school security
cameras showed that the officers, unprovoked, tackled Dnigma down a flight of stairs, beat her,
tased her, and ultimately arrested her as her classmates and teachers watched. 97 Prior to the release
of video footage of the incident, the Cook County State's Attorney's Office charged Dnigma with
two counts of felony aggravated battery, which could potentially have led to expulsion and jail
time. 98

The video footage from this incident is shocking, leaving many people wondering why a
school-based police officer would take such drastic actions toward a student who did not pose a
threat. But in the context of a national school system embedded with the school-to-prison pipeline,
these SROs' actions are not surprising. The school-to-prison pipeline, "a disturbing national trend
wherein children are funneled out of public schools and into the juvenile and criminal justice
systems," 99 is the result of discretionary school discipline policies that are disproportionately
applied against children of color, zero-tolerance policies, and the overall criminalization of school
discipline. 100
In 1994, Congress passed the Gun-Free Schools Act, which required a year-long
suspension for any student that brought a weapon to school. 10 1 As schools around the country
began to implement zero-tolerance policies, the number of student suspensions and expulsions
drastically increased, particularly for Black and Hispanic students.10 2 After the passage of the GunFree Schools Act, many schools expanded the scope of their zero-tolerance policies and began
giving harsher consequences for minor school discipline offenses. 103 The overall trend: more

92

Id.

93 See id.

94 Curtis Black, Police in Schools, Gang DatabaseScandals Offer Lightfoot FirstTest on Reform, CHI. REP. (April
18, 2019), https://www.chicagoreporter.com/police-in-schools-gang-database-scandals-offer-lightfoot-first-test-onreform/; Matthew Hendrickson, Cops Removed from Chicago School After Stun Gun Used on Student, CHI. SUNTIMES (Feb. 2, 2019), https://chicago.suntimes.com/news/video-cps-police-public-school-stun-gun-special-edresource-officer/.
95 Hendrickson, supra note 94.
96 Id.

97 Id.; Black, supra note 94.
98 Hendrickson, supra note 94.

99 School-to-Prison Pipeline, AM. Civ. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/issues/juvenile-justice/schoolprison-pipeline (last visited Feb. 16, 2020) [hereinafter School-to-Prison Pipeline].
100 Libby Nelson & Dara Lind, The School to Prison Pipeline, Explained, JUST. POL'Y INST. (Feb. 24, 2015),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/news/8775.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103
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schools were pushing an increasing number of students out of their schools. 104 Still today, schools
suspend and expel Black students and students with disabilities at a much higher rate. 105
In order to enforce their increasingly punitive school policies, many schools around the
country have relied on SROs rather than teachers and administrators for discipline. 106 Although
some schools have begun to rein in the role of SROs, many teachers still rely on them to handle
routine school discipline issues. 10 7 Once an SRO has been notified, police actions, such as arrests
and juvenile justice referrals, are determined by the officer that responds to the call. 10 8 Students
that attend schools with SROs are significantly more likely to be arrested for discretionary criminal
violations like disorderly conduct than those at schools without SROs. 10 9 In addition, data from
the U.S. Department of Education shows that students of color and students with disabilities are
disproportionately subjected to school-based arrests and referrals to law enforcement.1 1 0
Nationwide, students with disabilities comprise 12 percent of school populations but represent 25
percent of school-based arrests and referrals to law enforcement.I Similarly, Black students, who
make up 16 percent of the school population, represent 31 percent of school-based arrests.1 1 2 Every
time an SRO is notified or responds to a school disciplinary matter, it puts students of color and
students with disabilities at a greater risk of entering the juvenile justice system.
Police officers are also not equipped or trained to manage school behavior in a healthy or
age-appropriate manner. As of the beginning of the 2019-2020 school year, 14.6 percent of CPS
students had an individualized education plan (IEP), and nationwide, approximately three-quarters
of children face at least one traumatic event in their lives before they turn eighteen.1 13 Yet
alarmingly, many SROs have limited to no training on adolescent psychology or development,
working with youth exposed to violence and trauma, and the behavioral safeguards that must be
taken with students who have IEPs.1 1 4 An SRO best practice report published by the U.S.
Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Justice recommends that school districts
train SROs, among other areas, in childhood development and adolescent psychology, special

104 Id.
105 School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 99; Executive Summary of DANIEL J. LOSEN & PAUL MARTINEZ, LOST

OPPORTUNITIES: How DISPARATE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE CONTINUES TO DRIVE DIFFERENCES IN THE OPPORTUNITY TO

LEARN (2020).
106 Nelson & Lind, supra note 100.
107 School-to-Prison Pipeline, supra note 99.
108 See CHI. PUB. SCHS., UNDERSTANDING SCHOOL BEHAVIOR
DATA 2,

https://cps.edu/Performance/Documents/Datafiles/SuspensionExplusionFactSheet.pdf
109 Bezahler, supra note
8.

(last visited May 8, 2019).

110 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., OFF. FOR CIV. RTS., CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION DATA SNAPSHOT: SCHOOL

DISCIPLINE 1 (2014), https://ocrdata.ed.gov/Downloads/CRDC-School-Discipline-Snapshot.pdf.
1" Id.
112 Id.
113 Stats and Facts, CHI. PUB. SCHS., https://cps.edu/AboutCPS/At-a-glance/Pages/Statsandfacts.aspx (last
visited Nov. 1, 2020); Cops and No Counselors, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/issues/juvenilejustice/school-prison-pipeline/cops-and-no-counselors (last visited Nov. 11, 2020) [hereinafter Cops and No
Counselors].
114 Amanda Merkwae, Schooling the Police: Race, Disability, and the Conduct of School Resource Officers, 21
MICH. J. RACE & L. 146, 163 (2015); see also HOLLY KURTH ET AL., SCHOOL POLICING: RESULTS OF A NATIONAL

SURVEY OF SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICERS 15 (2018), https://www.edweek.org/media/school-resource-officer-surveycopyright-education-week.pdf.
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education and disability issues, trauma-informed responses, conflict resolution, and restorative
justice." 5
In Chicago, many of the schools targeted with social media surveillance are in communities
that already face over-policing. 11 6 Research has shown that a pervasive police presence in the
school environment can have a damaging impact on student's physical and psychological wellbeing.1 1 7 Studies have shown that frequent interactions with police at school can act as a
psychological trigger and over time can cause anxiety, lack of motivation, and aggressive
behaviors.11 8 In particular, many students of color do not see police officers as a resource, but
rather as people they cannot trust.1 19 Police officers and SROs are not equipped to support students
emotionally and psychologically. 120 As a result of their lack of trauma-informed training, SROs
may only serve to fuel student trauma. 121
Additionally, SROs' involvement in routine school discipline and lack of training has led
to a documented pattern of bad-policing, excessive use of force against minor students, and
significant numbers of misconduct complaints filed. 122 As of 2016, 67 percent of SROs in Chicago
had complaints filed against them with the Independent Police Review Authority; 31 percent had
three or more complaints and 11 percent had ten or more complaints. 12 3 Chicago has had to pay
for this misconduct; Chicago schools amassed over $2 million in SRO misconduct settlements
from 2012 to 2016 alone. 124 About three-quarters of the settlement dollars were for the use of
excessive force against a minor. 125

Although many schools are not purposely pushing kids into the juvenile justice system,
disciplining students with suspensions "makes it more likely that they'll end up there." 126 A study
conducted by the Council of State Governments Justice Center and Texas A&M University's
Public Policy Research Institute examined millions of records for Texas seventh graders from 2001
to 2003 and then tracked the cohort for six years to study the relationship between school
discipline, academic outcomes, and juvenile justice involvement. 127 The study discussed three
notable findings regarding school discipline and suspensions. 128 First, school administrators have
a lot of discretion in their discipline decisions. 129 Demographically similar schools suspended and
115 U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. & U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., SAFE SCHOOL-BASED ENFORCEMENT
THROUGH COLLABORATION,
UNDERSTANDING, AND RESPECT (SECURE): LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION RUBRIC 4-5 (2016) [hereinafter SECURE],

https://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/secure-implementation.pdf. This federal guidance was developed to
support school districts, schools, and police departments in deciding what kind of school-police partnerships will
help create safer schools and communities. Id. at 1.
116 Leibowitz & Karp, supra note 27.
1"7 MBEKEANI-WILEY, supra note 12, at 18.
118 Id.
119 See id. at 9.
120 See KURTH ET AL., supra note 114.

121 See Cops and No Counselors, supra note 113.
122 The U.S. Dept. of Education SRO guidance also recommends that school districts prohibit SROs from
engaging
in routine school discipline and from enforcing school policies. SECURE, supra note 115, at 3.
123 MBEKEANI-WILEY, supra note 12, at 11.
2 Id. at 13.
125 Id.
126 Nelson & Lind, supra note
100.
127 Donna St. George, Study Shows Wide Varieties in DisciplineMethods Among Very SimilarSchools,
WASH. POST
(July 19, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/study-exposes-some-some-myths-about-schooldiscipline/2011/07/18/gIQAV0sZMI_story.html.
128 Id.
129 Id.
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expelled students at very different rates. 130 Additionally, 97 percent of students were disciplined
for discretionary offenses, compared to the less than 3 percent who were suspended or expelled
for illegal behavior. 13 1 Second, students that are suspended at least once are far more likely to
repeat a grade than students who have never been suspended. 132 Thirty-one percent of students
who were expelled or suspended at least once repeated a grade, compared to only 5 percent of
students who were never suspended or expelled. 133 Third, students who have been suspended or
expelled are more likely to have some contact with the juvenile justice system than students who
have not been disciplined in these ways. 134 The study discovered that students with at least one
suspension in their disciplinary history were more than ten times as likely to become involved in
the juvenile justice system than students who had not been suspended.1 35 The conclusion from
these findings: harsh, discretionary penalties for breaking school rules hold back students
academically and push them into the juvenile justice system. 136
A 2015 research study on disparities in school discipline provides insight on the role
implicit bias plays in the school-to-prison pipeline.1 37 In the experiment, the researchers showed a
racially diverse sample of female K-12 teachers the fictitious school records of a middle-schoolaged student who had misbehaved twice in minor, unrelated ways. 13 8 The researchers requested

that the teachers imagine they were working in the classroom with this fictitious student. 139 The
researchers then asked the teachers a number of questions to identify and evaluate how the teachers
would respond to both of the student's behavioral incidents. 140 All of the scenarios were identical;
however, the researchers manipulated the perception of the students' races by giving some teachers
a fictitious student with a stereotypical White name (Greg or Jake) and some teachers a student
with a stereotypical Black name (Darnell or Deshawn). 14 1 The results showed that teachers were
more likely to escalate disciplinary consequences for the second incident when the student was
thought to be Black as opposed to White. 14 2 Additionally, the teacher group was more likely to
believe the two infractions by the Black student were connected. 143 This research shows that bias
plays a role in school disciplinary decisions and, at least in part, explains the large racial disparities
in the school-to-prison pipeline. 14 4
The new technological surveillance methods discussed above are being implemented into
the same discretionary and biased school discipline system that manifested the school-to-prison
pipeline. The introduction of social media and school technology monitoring has experts
concerned that students of color and students with disabilities may have adverse interactions with

130

Id
Id.
132 Id.
133 Nelson & Lind, supra note
100.
134 Id.
135 St. George, supra note 127.
136 Nelson & Lind, supra note
100.
137 Jason A. Okonofua & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Two Strikes: Race and the Discipliningof Young Students,
26
PSYCH. Sci. 617, 617-23 (2015).
138 Id.at 618.
139 Id.
14 0
Id
141 Id.
142 Id. at 620.
143 Id.
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police and the justice system. 14 5 Increased surveillance in schools will inevitably intensify the
existing disparities in school discipline. As discussed, students of color are much more likely to be
punished for the same conduct as their White peers. Without addressing the systemic bias in school
discipline, the unfairness embedded in that system will only increase with advanced technological
surveillance because school officials will be able to discover more code of conduct violations. 14 6
Particularly with technology and social media surveillance, schools now have the ability to monitor
and scrutinize areas of their students' lives that were previously private. Additionally, students
from wealthy families can communicate on privately purchased devices without fear of school
monitoring, unlike students from low-income families who may only have access to monitored
school-issued devices-further contributing to the disparities in school discipline. 147 Put plainly,
technologically enhanced school surveillance and monitoring will increase the number of school
discipline infractions (and false positives) detected. Given what we know about the school-toprison pipeline, these enhanced surveillance methods will increase the probability that a
disproportionate number of students of color and students with disabilities will be pushed into the
juvenile justice system.
With these monitoring technologies, there is a heightened understanding that students are
constantly being watched. As more schools begin to implement these surveillance methods,
students may be becoming increasingly desensitized to the idea that the private information they
have on their devices is being monitored by school officials. 14 8 A 2016 report by the National
Association of State Boards of Education found that "surveilled students may feel they are in a
less nurturing, comfortable learning environment," and that the increased use of surveillance
methods "can interfere with the trust and cooperation learning requires by creating barriers among
students, teachers, and [school] officials, and casting schools in a negative light in students'
eyes." 149 In addition, students' awareness that everything they are searching for and writing online
might be monitored could hinder growth and self-discovery.1 5 0 Rather than deter students from
engaging in harmful conduct on their devices, this monitoring may only teach students not to share
things, especially online.15 1 This could lead students who do not want to be questioned by school
officials or be subject to school or criminal violations to "shut themselves off' and not come to
adults for support-the opposite effect these schools likely intend to create.15 2
IV.

FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS

A. School-Based Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
Over the past four decades, the United States Supreme Court has addressed how the
Constitution applies to school-based searches. This school-specific Fourth Amendment
145 Beckett, supra note 10.
146 Richard W. Walker, Schools Must Weigh the Benefits and Consequences of Surveillance Technologies,
EDSCOOP (Oct. 24, 2016), https://edscoop.com/schools-must-weigh-the-benefits-and-consequences-ofsurveillance-technologies/.
147 Id.
148 Haskins, supra note
48.
149 J. William Tucker & Amelia Vance, School Surveillance: The Consequencesfor Equity and
Privacy, EDUC.
LEADERS REP., Oct. 2016, at 1, 8.
150 Beckett, supra note
10.
151 Haskins, supra note
48.
152 Id.
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jurisprudence seeks to balance students' privacy interests with the governmental interest in student
discipline and safety.15 3
Beginning with New Jersey v. T.L.O. in 1985, the Court recognized that "requiring a
teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or
of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the swift and informal disciplinary procedures
needed in the schools." 154 The Court justified this holding by invoking the challenges of
maintaining a safe school environment:
Maintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in
recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms:
drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major social
problems. Even in schools that have been spared the most severe
disciplinary problems, the preservation of order and a proper
educational
environment
requires
close
supervision
of
schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct
that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult.1 55
Thus, the Court found it necessary to create flexible standards for school officials to conduct
searches of students at school. 156 It developed a two-step reasonableness standard for school-based
searches: school officials must consider (1) whether the "action was justified at its inception," and
(2) "whether the search as actually conducted 'was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances
which justified the interference in the first place."'157
Through its holdings in Board of Education v. Earls and Vernonia School District47J v.
Acton, the Supreme Court further diminished the privacy and Fourth Amendment rights of students
in public schools. In Vernonia and Earls, although the actions taken by these school districts did
not meet the test established in T.L.O., the Court lowered the standard by holding that suspicionless
searches in the form of drug testing public school students who participate in competitive
extracurricular activities or sports does not disturb the Fourth Amendment.15 8 The Court found that
when students sign up for extracurricular activities, they have reason to expect more intrusions on
their privacy rights. 159 Additionally, the Court took into account the diminished expectation of
privacy in the school setting, the lack of intrusiveness of the drug testing, and "the severity of the
need met by the search." 160
Only once has the Supreme Court found a school-based search unreasonable. In Safford
Unified School District#1 v. Redding, the Court held that the strip search of a thirteen-year-old
female student was unreasonable, even though the school officials had reasonable suspicion to
believe she possessed prescription strength ibuprofen. 161 The Court found that the extent of the
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985); Bd. Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 828-29 (2002); Safford
Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653
(1995).
154 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at
340.
155 Id. at 339 (citation omitted).
156 Id. at 340.
157 Id. at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968)).
158 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65; Earls, 536 U.S.
at 838.
159 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657; Earls, 536 U.S. at 831-32
160 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657, 664-65.
161 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364,
368 (2009).
153
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search was unreasonable, but it did not hold that strip searches in schools by school officials were
per se unreasonable. 162 The Court left the door open by stating that other circumstances, such as
"some greater level of particularized suspicion" of a more serious crime, 163 could permit a strip
search. 164 In Safford, the Court relied on the second prong from the T.L.O. reasonableness test to
declare that "a school search 'will be permissible . . . when the measures adopted are reasonably
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of
165
the student and the nature of the infraction."'
School districts around the country have used these Supreme Court cases as guidelines
when conducting searches and implementing new methods of student surveillance. However, these
major holdings were decided prior to the technologically advanced and invasive surveillance
methods used by school districts today. The privacy concerns raised by these expanding
surveillance practices have yet to be addressed in any meaningful way.
The current state of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on school searches leaves many
unanswered questions on whether school districts' and police officers' recent use of invasive
surveillance complies with its rulings, particularly in terms of monitoring of school-issued
technology. Although the surveillance and monitoring discussed in this article does not take the
same form as a traditional school-based search, schools that implement these surveillance methods
engage in a continuous search of students' private data and information.
B. Riley: How Technology Can Affect Privacy Interests
Even though the Supreme Court has held that students have a diminished expectation of
privacy while at school, school districts' monitoring of students online, especially when not on
school property, implicates the Fourth Amendment. In the landmark case, New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
the Supreme Court established that while students do not give up their Fourth Amendment rights
when they enter the school building, they do have a diminished expectation of privacy while in
school. 166 More specifically, the Court found that the Fourth Amendment only requires school
officials to have a reasonable suspicion of illicit activity to justify a search of a student or their
personal effects. 167

When applying the Supreme Court's school-based search jurisprudence to the surveillance
methods discussed in this article, it is important also to look to the Supreme Court's ruling in Riley
v. California. In 2014, the Court held in Riley that under the Fourth Amendment, the government
may not conduct a warrantless search of the contents of a cell phone seized incident to an arrest
unless exigent circumstances exist. 168 The Court reasoned that a search of data on a cellphone is a
massive invasion of privacy:
Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from
other objects that might be kept on an arrestee's person. The term
"cell phone" is itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices
are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to
162

Id. at 375-77.

Id. at 388 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 377.
165 Id. at 370 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325 (1985)).
166 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334, 341
(1985).
167 Id. at 341-42.
168 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 401-02 (2014).
163
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be used as a telephone. They could just as easily be called cameras,
video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries,
albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers. 169
Thus, due to the nature of cell phones and their ability to store an immense amount of private
information, scholars have asserted that Riley established searching an individual's cell phone
implicates a "higher order" of privacy right. 170
This higher order of privacy does not end when a school-age person enters a school
building. 17 1 However, most pre-Riley courts have considered cell phone searches by school
officials to be reasonable as long as the search follows the reasonableness test in T.L.0.172 Yet, the
surveillance and monitoring of students' devices taking place in American schools is often done
separate from a school official having an individualized suspicion that a student has violated a
school rule involving their cell phone. 173
C. Earls and Vernonia: Suspicionless School Searches
Due to the suspicionless nature of school technology surveillance, the Supreme Court's
holdings in Earls and Vernonia provide the most direction in determining how future courts may
address this issue. In both cases, the Court upheld suspicionless drug testing of student athletes;
and in Earls, any student who participated in a competitive extracurricular could also be tested
without reasonable suspicion. 174 However, the Earls decision made clear that the drug testing
policy did not apply to the entire student body.17 5 Separating out the students who participate in
any competitive extracurricular, the Court "conducted a fact-specific balancing of the intrusion on
the children's Fourth Amendment rights against the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests." 176 Regardless of the reasonableness inquiry mandated by T.L.O., the Court, following
Vernonia, determined that the "reasonableness inquiry cannot disregard the school's custodial and
tutelary responsibility for children." 177 Thus, the Court found that subject to a balancing test,
individualized suspicion may not be required to conduct certain school-based searches, including
drug testing. 178
Again, the Court in Earls emphasized that the drug testing program only targeted
extracurricular students and found that the very nature of participating in an extracurricular activity
resulted in a more limited expectation of privacy than that of students who do not participate in
these activities. 179 Against the students' privacy interests, the Court weighed the "nature and
immediacy" of the government's interest in conducting suspicionless drug testing. 180 The Court
cited Vernonia in finding that the government had a legitimate interest in protecting students from
Id. at 393.
Bernard James, T.L.O. and Cell Phones: Student Privacy and Smart Devices After Riley v. California, 101 IOWA
L. REV. 343, 347-48, 352 (2016).
171 Id. at 351.
172 Id. at 352.
173 See, e.g., Gallimore v. Henrico Cty. Sch. Bd., 38 F.Supp.3d 721 (E.D.
Va. 2014).
174 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002).
175 Earls, 536 U.S. at 832.
176 Id. at 830.
177 Id. (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656).
178 Id.
179 Id. at 832.
180 Id. at 834.
169
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"the evil" of drug abuse problem that has plagued schools across the country. 181 Therefore, as a

result of the limited expectation of privacy of students involved in extracurricular activities and
the immediate and legitimate government interest, the Court held that suspicionless drug testing
did not violate students' Fourth Amendment rights.18 2
D. Application to School Surveillance Technology
It is unclear how far schools will be able to expand suspicionless searches under Earls and
Vernonia. However, constant surveillance of school technology clearly falls outside the boundaries
of these cases. Applying the balancing test from Earls to the enhanced methods of monitoring
explored in this article, school districts could raise the argument that the emerging epidemic of
school shootings justifies such surveillance and would cite the pressure they are under to take
drastic measures to prevent the next shooting. Going further, schools could also claim that they
have a legitimate and immediate interest to keep guns, violence, and drugs out of the school
building.
But as tragic and shocking as school violence is, compared to other places, our school
buildings are much safer. 183 Remarkably, homes are almost 200 times more dangerous for children

than schools. 184 To put this into perspective, "any given school [in the United States] can expect
to experience a student homicide about once every 6,000 years." 185 Yet, the fear of school violence
has driven schools to harden their school buildings and environments, and take drastic measures
all in the name of school safety. Justice Stevens cautioned in his concurrence in T.L.O. that "[to]
the extent that deeply intrusive searches are ever reasonable outside the custodial context, it surely
must only be to prevent imminent, and serious harm." 186 Although school shootings are a real and
present danger, the relatively low prevalence of school violence does not warrant the invasive and
continuous monitoring that exists with school technology surveillance.
Next, the governmental interest must be weighed against the privacy interests of students.
There are three primary considerations in determining students' privacy interests against
suspicionless school surveillance. First, in contrast to Earls and Vernonia, every student at a school
that has implemented school technology monitoring is subjected to the suspicionless surveillance.
Therefore, the classification used by the Court in Earls to determine a limited expectation of
privacy for extracurricular students does not exist with this type of search. Without that
classification, the student body as a whole will be assumed to have a greater expectation of privacy
than the students in either Earls or Vernonia. Second, as mentioned above, the Court in Riley
characterized a person's privacy interest in their cell phone as a higher order of privacy. 187
Importantly, the reasons a cell phone demands a higher degree of privacy also apply to the
surveilled school-supplied devices students use at school. Finally, school-age children in particular
have an enhanced privacy interest in their electronic devices against invasive searches
monitoring a student's messages, emails, social media, and internet searches unlocks a view into
Id. (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662).
Id. at 838.
Erin K. Nekvasil et al., Prevalenceand Offense Characteristicsof Multiple Casualty Homicides: Are Schools at
Higher Risk Than Other Locations?, 5 PSYCH. OF VIOLENCE 236, 241 (2015).
184 Id. at 238.
185 Randy Borum et al., What Can Be Done About School Shootings? A Review of the Evidence, 39
EDUC. RSCHR.
27, 27 (2010).
186 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 382 n.25 (1985).
187 James, supra note 170, at 347-48.
181
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a student's entire private life. 188 This is a far greater scope of a search than has been discussed in
any of the Supreme Court's school searches jurisprudence. Comparing these extremely intrusive
suspicionless searches against the government's interest, the scales certainly appear to weigh in
favor of a student's privacy interest.
The combination of these surveillance methods has the potential to put students in a school
environment where their personal and digital lives are constantly being watched. A line must be
drawn to preserve what is left of students' privacy interests while they are at school, a place where
they spend most of their time. This line should be clearly drawn to prevent suspicionless
surveillance of students' technology on and off school property. Following the Court's school
searches jurisprudence: this surveillance is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.
V.

THE WAY FORWARD: MENTAL HEALTH OVER SURVEILLANCE

In an age where it seems like hardening our schools is the only way forward in terms of
protecting students, schools are generally not under a threat of violence. However, schools still
have an obligation to keep their students safe, and decisions that harden school buildings and
disciplinary systems are often the most popular, especially in the aftermath of tragic school
violence. Currently, no independent evaluation has been conducted to show whether these methods
of surveillance are effective in reducing violence or self-harm. Conversely, experts have found
that this type of invasive surveillance may do more harm than good to children, especially students
of color and students with disabilities. 189

There is not an easy answer on how to keep students safe, in school, and on the path to
healthy and productive futures. Yet, there are numerous effective alternative programs available
for schools to prevent violence and create healthier school environments in lieu of invasive
surveillance. Some of these alternative programs include Cognitive Behavior Therapy (CBT),
conflict resolution, family therapy, life skills training, Multisystemic Therapy (MST), Positive
Behavior Interventions and Supports (PBIS), trauma-informed interventions, and restorative
justice, just to name a few. 190 Although a detailed examination of the various programs and
interventions is beyond the scope of this article, a brief discussion of the need and value of mental
health workers and trauma-informed school staff will highlight a way forward from the invasive
and punitive school surveillance systems that have hardened schools.
Schools that invest more money and resources into social workers and mental health
resources experience better attendance rates, higher academic success, and have lower rates of
expulsion and suspension. 19 1 Almost three-quarters of children face one traumatic event or more
in their lives before they turn eighteen. 192 About one in three students who experience a traumatic
event will show signs of post-traumatic stress disorder, and trauma will often affect a student's

188 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 ("Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are
reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the
student and the nature of the infraction.").
189 Beckett, supra note 10.
190 Jim Feger, Trainer, Sch. Threat Assessment Consultants, Presentation at the Comprehensive School
Threat
Assessment Guidelines Workshop (Feb. 11, 2020) (presentation slides on file with the author).
191 Cops and No Counselors, supra note
113.
192 Id.
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performance and behavior in school. 193 Many students also do not have the necessary coping
mechanisms to manage their traumatic and stressful life experiences. 194
Studies show that the presence of mental health workers in school settings creates safer
and higher achieving schools. 195 Mental health workers could be especially helpful for students
who have experienced trauma, which could have an even greater impact in low-income school
districts where students are much more likely to use school-based mental health resources due to
the scarcity of such resources in the community. 196 The National Association of Social Workers
(NASW) recommends that every school should maintain a 250:1 student to social worker ratio. 197
As of 2018, CPS had a ratio of 1,200:1, meaning that CPS would need to add 1,000 social workers
to meet the minimum standards recommended by NASW.1 98 Chicago is not alone: forty-seven
states and the District of Columbia do not meet the minimum standards for social worker ratios. 199
Marshall Metropolitan High School, the CPS school that Dnigma Howard attended, had more
SROs than social workers at the time that she was arrested. 200 This has been the trend across the

country. Funding for school-based health professionals has decreased, while investment in student
surveillance systems and SRO programs surged. 20 1 In light of the compelling studies that
demonstrate the benefits to school health and safety, school districts would be prudent to invest
more resources into their health professionals. Alternatively, schools can invest in their current
staff and provide trauma-informed training to teachers, administrators, coaches, and faculty.
For the schools that insist on using invasive surveillance methods, they must use these
systems for healthy interventions that put the focus on the safety and development of the student.
Further, school mental health workers must staff and operate these systems and only involve law
enforcement and heightened school discipline decisions when absolutely necessary. School
districts everywhere must be hyperaware of the ways implicit bias and discretion have infiltrated
every aspect of school discipline systems and create equitable systems that address these injustices.
Lastly, schools must understand that suspicionless monitoring and surveillance of students'
technology and social media is a massive and alarming intrusion into their personal lives and will
undoubtedly fuel the school-to-prison pipeline. And as a result of the Supreme Court's rulings in
T.L.O., Earls, Vernonia, Safford, and Riley, this level of intrusion must be deemed unreasonable
and unconstitutional.
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